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HE TEXAS ECONOMY slowed dramatically in 1998. Total
nonfarm employment grew at only a 3.3-percent annual rate
in the first 11 months of the year, after very strong 4.6-
percent growth in 1997. Furthermore, as Chart 1 illustrates,
Texas employment growth slowed throughout the year. Total
nonfarm employment grew at a 4.1-percent annual rate in
the first half of 1998, at a 2.6-percent annual rate in the third quarter
and at only a 2-percent annual rate in the fourth quarter (October
and November).
Although all major sectors of the economy slowed from the torrid
pace of 1997, weakness in the Texas economy was confined generally
to the mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Led by strong
growth in business services and transportation, service sector employ-
ment grew at a 3.6-percent annual rate in 1998. Meanwhile, rising
rents and low vacancy and interest rates fueled a banner year for the
Texas construction industry. Office and apartment vacancy rates in
Austin, Dallas, Fort Worth and Houston are all lower now than they
were during the go-go days of the early 1980s.
Lower energy prices are the primary reason for weakness in the
mining sector. Oil prices declined nearly 40 percent during 1998,
while natural gas prices declined 25 percent. As Chart 2 illustrates,
Texas drilling activity declined with prices. Employment in oil and
gas extraction fell by 7,500 workers (5 percent), and the Texas rig
count fell by 162 rigs (44 percent).
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TEXASUPDATEANDOUTLOOKMuch of the weakness in the manu-
facturing sector can be traced to eco-
nomic weakness overseas. Texas real
exports have declined for three con-
secutive quarters (Chart 3). In the first
half of the year, modest increases in ex-
ports to Canada and Mexico partially
offset declining exports to Asia and
Latin America, but by the third quarter,
exports to Texas’ NAFTA partners also
had declined. Texas exports are down
especially sharply in energy products
and agricultural crops. 
Low prices and weak export markets
both contributed to a bad year for Texas
agriculture, but the primary culprit was
Mother Nature. Severe drought devas-
tated crop yields across the state and
forced ranchers to liquidate their herds.
Strong Economic Head Winds
Should Continue to Blow in 1999
Strong economic head winds will
slow Texas economic activity in 1999. In
particular, the state’s economy will con-
tinue to face low oil prices, tight labor
markets and weakened trading partners.
Low Oil Prices. Industry contacts 
report that energy producers are pull-
ing back hard in preparation for a pro-
longed period of low prices. The fu-
tures market is forecasting a marked 
increase in oil prices by the end of
1999. However, even if the price of
West Texas Intermediate crude returns
to the $14 range, the price will still be
below the cost of production for some
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Texas Real Exports Decline
































NOTE: Asian crisis includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. Latin America includes
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. Euroland includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.Texas firms, and the energy industry
should continue to shrink.
The merger mania that has taken
hold in the industry could also lead to
substantial job cuts. For example, the
British Petroleum–Amoco merger is ex-
pected to reduce worldwide employment
in the two firms by 6,000 jobs, many of
which may be in Texas. Similarly, the pro-
posed Exxon–Mobil merger is expected
to reduce worldwide employment in
the two firms by 9,000 jobs. However,
Texas could actually gain jobs if the
merged firms consolidate into the region.
Tight Labor Markets. Unemploy-
ment rates remain below the national
average in many parts of the state
(Table 1), and the national average is
low enough to be considered full em-
ployment by many analysts. In a full
employment environment, labor force
growth limits employment growth (see
box entitled “Labor Market Tightness”),
and Texas will be hard pressed to gen-
erate labor force growth much in excess
of 2 percent in 1999. Because labor
markets are much tighter in north and
central Texas than they are along the
Gulf Coast or the border, difficulties
finding workers are more likely to re-
strain growth in the Dallas/Fort Worth
area than in Corpus Christi or El Paso.
Weakened Trading Partners. None
of Texas’ major trading partners is in par-
ticularly robust health, so export growth
is likely to be anemic in 1999. Mexico
continues to post solid GDP numbers;
however, other economic data suggest
weakness (Chart 4). Falling oil prices
are a significant drag on the Mexican
economy and have forced the Mexican
government (which receives more than
a quarter of its revenues from oil) to
adopt an austere budget for 1999. The
real peso has regained some of its recent
losses in purchasing power relative to the
dollar, primarily because Mexican infla-
tion has risen sharply. The purchasing
power of the average Mexican consumer
has probably not improved. Texas re-
tailers indicate that sales to Mexican 
nationals have been disappointing.
Canadian purchasing power fell even
more than Mexican purchasing power
in 1998 (Chart 5 ). Exports to Canada
(Texas’ No. 2 trading partner) fell 6.6
percent in third quarter 1998 and are
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Texas MSAs, November 1998
Bryan 1.7 Tyler 4.6
Austin 2.5 Wichita Falls 4.8
Lubbock 2.8 San Angelo 5.2
Dallas 3.0 Sherman 5.5
Fort Worth/ 3.0 Brazoria 5.8
Arlington Galveston 6.1
Amarillo 3.3 Texarkana 6.2
San Antonio 3.3 Midland–Odessa 6.4
Abilene 3.6 Corpus Christi 6.5
Waco 3.6 Beaumont 7.3
Killeen 3.8 Longview 7.5
Houston 3.9 Laredo 9.3
Victoria 4.4 El Paso 9.9
Brownsville 11.6




Imports of capital goods
Net insufficient inventories
Employment cost index (reversed sign)
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–30 –25 –20 –15 –10 –5 0 5 10 15as the pause that refreshes. Concerns
about overbuilding have eased some-
what, and builders who were cut off by
the pullback of real estate investment
trusts (REITs) and insurance companies
are finding other, more conventional
sources of finance. Housing markets are
generally tight, although Houston con-
tacts report that some buyers are back-
ing out of contracts. Residential rents
are increasing at twice the rate of infla-
tion and have been rising faster in
Texas than in the nation as a whole—
two factors that should fuel continued
building activity in 1999. There should
also be a substantial increase in high-
way construction in 1999.
High-tech manufacturing should con-
tribute more to the economy in 1999
than it did in 1998. The Semiconductor
Industry Association predicts that sales
will grow 9 percent in 1999, after shrink-
ing nearly 11 percent in 1998.
1 Com-
puter industry contacts report that PC
sales have increased. Continued con-
cerns about the Year 2000 problem may
also foster some increase in sales of
computers and computer equipment in 
1999 (although a 1999 sales binge could
mean a hangover for the computer in-
dustry in 2000).
Exports, agriculture and energy will
be a drag on the Texas economy, but
are unlikely to completely upset the
economic apple cart. Texas is much less
sensitive to energy prices now than it
was during the early 1980s (see box en-
titled “The New Texas Economy”). Re-
sources that are freed up from these
industries are likely to be snapped up
by other industries looking to expand,
thereby easing some of the problems
created by tight labor markets.
Bottom Line. As long as the U.S.
economy continues to grow, the Texas
economy should do likewise. We ex-
pect that Texas employment will grow
approximately 2 percent in 1999, there-
by registering the 11th consecutive year
in which Texas employment growth ex-
ceeds the national average.
— Lori L. Taylor
Stephen P. A. Brown
Fiona Sigalla
Mine K. Yücel s Note
1 See Dean Takahashi (1998), “Chip Industry Forecasts a Broad Re-
covery,” Wall Street Journal, November 12, A3.
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unlikely to rebound much in the near
term. The sharpest declines in exports
came in oil and gas, furniture and pri-
mary metals.
Elsewhere, Japan continues to be mired
in recession, the Asian crisis countries
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South
Korea and Thailand) are at best bouncing
along the bottom, the European econo-
mies are expected to slow and recent po-
litical events in Brazil and Venezuela have
increased concern about Latin America.
Outlook for 1999:
Slower Growth but No Recession 
The construction industry should con-
tinue to register solid growth in 1999.
The industry weathered a financing scare
in fall 1998 that industry contacts view
Labor Market Tightness
For several years, Texas has been in the
grips of a tightening labor market. Firms across
the state (but especially in major metropolitan
areas away from the Mexican border) have re-
ported increasing difficulty finding all types of
workers—from secretaries to statistical pro-
grammers. Industry contacts report they are
turning away business because they don’t
have enough staff to do the work.
Labor market tightness has simple causes.
For employment to grow, one of three things
has to happen—the population has to grow,
labor force participation has to rise or the un-
employment rate has to fall.
Slow population growth is not the source of
Texas’ tight labor markets. Texas population
has grown at twice the national rate, or nearly 2 percent per year, throughout the 1990s. Two
important factors explain the faster growth—a faster rate of natural increase (meaning that
Texas’ young population produces substantially more births than deaths each year) and
strong net domestic migration (meaning that more people from other states move in than 
Texans move out).
Texas population growth may be strong, but at more than 3 percent per year, the state’s
typical job growth is even stronger. Sustaining job growth greater than population growth re-
quires either that an increasing fraction of the population enter the labor force each year or
that the unemployment rate fall.
Because the labor force participation rate has held steady at roughly the national rate
throughout the 1990s, the unemployment rate has been taking up the slack. Texas’ unem-
ployment rate has dropped to its lowest level in over 18 years (see chart). Take out the 
border, and the rest of the state’s unemployment rate is below 4 percent. Four percent un-
employment is well below the rate that most economists use to define full employment.
In a full employment environment, labor force growth limits employment growth and, bar-
ring a major change in the labor force participation rate, population growth limits labor force
growth. Because there is no reason to believe that the rate of population growth has in-
creased recently or is going to increase much in the near future, tight labor markets are likely
to restrain Texas employment growth for some time.
Falling Unemployment Rate
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The New Texas Economy
The last time nominal oil prices hit $11 per barrel—in 1986—the Texas economy fell
off a cliff. This time the economy is likely to do little more than stumble.
Chart A illustrates the strong correlation between oil prices and the Texas economy
during the 1980s. The figure plots inflation-adjusted oil prices and deviations from trend
employment. Deviations from trend employment indicate the extent to which the actual
level of employment differs from the level of employment one would have expected if
the economy were growing at its long-term trend rate of growth (3.3 percent per year).
When the deviations are rising (as was the case during the boom), employment is grow-
ing faster than trend. When the deviations are falling (as was the case during the bust),
employment is growing more slowly than trend. A horizontal line indicates that employ-
ment is growing at trend.
If we assume that the influence of
oil prices has remained unchanged
and remove it from the picture, we
can see a fairly strong, historical cor-
relation between Texas and U.S. em-
ployment (Chart B). However, the relationship seems to have broken down recently.
Controlling for the negative influence of falling oil prices, Texas was well above its long-
term trend in 1998, while the United States was not. In other words, the Texas economy
is doing much better than would be predicted on the basis of its historical relationships
with oil prices and the U.S. economy. This evidence implies that either Texas’ economic
relationship with the United States has changed or the economic influence of oil prices
has changed.
Work by Dallas Fed economists Stephen Brown and Mine Yücel suggests that the
economic influence of oil prices has changed. Although Texas is still hurt by falling oil
prices, Brown and Yücel estimate that the state is 75 percent less sensitive to oil price
fluctuations today than it was in 1982. In 1982, a 10-percent reduction in oil prices would
have reduced total
Texas employment by
an estimated 1.37 percent when multiplier effects are included. In 1998,
the same 10-percent reduction would lower total Texas employment 
by an estimated 0.36 percent (about 32,000 jobs) including multiplier 
effects. Even with the slower growth the state experienced in 1998, Texas
still added nearly 24,000 jobs per month.
One reason for the declining influence of oil prices is the rising im-
portance of energy consumers to the Texas economy. For example, the
airline industry had a very good year in 1998 and would benefit sub-
stantially from continued low fuel costs. Three of the nation’s top seven
airlines are based in Texas (American, Continental and Southwest).
Although falling energy prices are becoming less influential for Texas
as a whole, they are likely to have a substantial influence on the distri-
bution of economic activity in the state. As Chart C illustrates, Mother 
Nature serves Texas Tea in only some parts of the state; in other parts,
energy consumers dominate the economic landscape. For example, in
Dallas/Fort Worth, which represents one quarter of economic activity in
the state, the transportation industry is much more important than the 
energy industry. The total employment of Dallas/Fort Worth mining firms
approximately equals the local employment at American Airlines alone.
Total transportation employment is more than seven times mining em-
ployment in Dallas/Fort Worth. Therefore, Dallas/Fort Worth may benefit
from lower oil prices, while other parts of the state—such as Houston—
will undoubtedly lose.
Chart A
Texas’ Historic Sensitivity 
to Oil Prices
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Chart C
The Distribution of Oil and Gas 
Activity in Texas
Counties with at least twice 
the state average of personal 
income share from oil and 
gas, 1994.
Counties with no oil and gas 
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OTHING LASTS FOREVER. The
maxim is particularly apt when
it comes to America’s dynamic
economy. Each day brings
something new. Companies ex-
pand into new markets, and
they downsize. They add new products
and discontinue others. In three short
years, an enterprise like Amazon.com
can go from start-up to a market value
of $17 billion—surpassing even that of
century-old Sears.
1 Boeing buys McDon-
nell Douglas; Citicorp absorbs Travelers;
Exxon merges with Mobil. These events
are only a sampling of the way our
economy continually shifts. Recent gen-
erations have witnessed mind-boggling
transformations in the way we work,
what we consume and how we do busi-
ness. Change may be the only constant
in our vibrant capitalist system.
A few years ago, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas’ Annual Report focused
on economic change. An essay titled
“The Churn: The Paradox of Progress”
examined the economic forces that con-
tinually roil labor markets.
2 Jobs are
created and destroyed as new ideas,
new products, new technologies, new
markets and new forms of industrial or-
ganization upset the status quo. The
essay emphasized that this relentless,
unsettling mechanism—what econo-
mist Joseph Schumpeter called “creative
destruction”
3—isn’t a curse on the cap-
italist system. To the contrary, it is the
way to economic progress and higher
living standards.
Economic forces don’t agitate only
labor markets, though. They also pro-
duce a corresponding “churn” among
employers. Companies, just like jobs,
are in a constant state of flux. Every
day, new firms are born. Every day,
some enterprises gain sales and profits
while others lose them. Every day, com-
panies merge, divest, downsize and go
out of business. As with the churn of
employment, this process is ultimately
healthy for the economy.
4 It shifts re-
sources to more productive uses, and 
it rewards companies for giving con-
sumers better products, greater variety
and lower prices.
The churn is most apparent among
small enterprises, which are often
launched with great energy and optimism
but too little financing and experience.
Some start-ups do make it, but small
businesses fail at a high rate.
5 This sector
of the economy would serve as a good
illustration of the churn at work, but data
on small private companies are sketchy.
Larger, publicly held companies are only
part of the economy, but regular reports
on their activities produce a compre-
hensive and reliable picture of the shift-
ing fortunes of American business.
A series of five snapshots of the cor-
porate elite provides a long-term view
of the churn among firms (Table 1). In
the early years of this century, companies
engaged in the production of metals,
oil, meatpacking and basic machinery
dominated the U.S. economy. They were,
in their own ways, the technology lead-
ers of their day. They introduced new
products and new production methods
and emerged as national suppliers to an
early industrial economy.
Although General Electric, AT&T and
the big oil companies have remained
among the largest U.S. industrial concerns
decade after decade, newcomers are 
always driving toward the top of the
rankings. At the end of World War II,
the producers of everyday products—
for example, Coca-Cola and Kodak—
made the top 20, evidence the nation had
begun its move from mass production
to mass consumption. In the past dec-
ade, such companies as Microsoft, Intel
and Cisco Systems have jumped into the
top echelon, testimony to the micro-
chip’s growing importance to the Amer-
ican economy. The rankings of Merck,
Pfizer, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Eli Lilly
reflect the advances in pharmaceuticals.
The churn is as relentless in the cor-
porate sector as it is in the labor market.
Of today’s 100 largest public compa-
nies, only five are holdovers from the
top 100 of 1917. Half the firms in the
top 100 are newcomers over just the
past two decades. Although flux is a
constant for the economy, the evidence
suggests that the pace has picked up. In
the 60 years after 1917, it took an aver-
age of 30 years to replace half the com-
panies in the top 100. Between 1977
and 1998, supplanting half the top 100
required an average of 12 years, nearly
tripling the turnover rate.
6
Market Capitalization Soars
Expanding the inquiry to cover all
publicly held U.S. companies, ranked
by change in market capitalization since
1990, provides a more detailed portrait
of the economy’s shifting ground. Dur-
ing the current eight-year expansion,
the market value of the overwhelming
majority of companies has increased.
Indeed, the total market capitalization
of U.S. companies has soared from $2.6
trillion to almost $10 trillion during the
decade.
7 Beneath the surface, however,
a lot of churning has occurred. To de-
pict the changing fortunes of America’s
companies, we looked at the relative
performance of market capitalization—
firms moving up and down in the peck-
ing order. When the market-value
ranking of Cisco Systems, a major Inter-
net supplier, jumped from 956 in 1990 to
15 in 1998, it reflected vast shifts in how
consumers are spending their money.
Oshkosh B’Gosh, a maker of children’s
clothing, dropped from 967 to 2,479,
suggesting it didn’t fare as well.
For the economy as a whole, it’s
been a dynamic time. Two entirely new
N
THECHURNAMONGFIRMS
Recycling America’s Corporate Elitecategories of companies have emerged
in the 1990s—biological products and
computer communications (Internet). In
eight years, hundreds of new firms have
entered the rankings and zoomed past
such established companies as Tandy,
Sunbeam and Pizza Inn. Falling in the
rankings, however, doesn’t necessarily
mean failure. An overwhelming major-
ity of companies increased their market
value. For example, Sears, Roebuck and
Co.’s value on financial markets nearly
doubled from 1990 to 1998. Neverthe-
less, Sears’ ranking in corporate America
fell 66 places—from 87 to 153, prov-
ing that even well-run, profitable enter-
prises have found it difficult to stay up
with the streaking Microsofts and Intels.
The gainers during 1990–98 were
technology, finance and health care.
Consumer products, both perishables
and durables, maintained their large
chunk of the economic pie. The share of
market capitalization slipped in recent
years for utilities, energy and basic ma-
terials. Some highlights from the data:
8
• Companies on the upswing in-
clude Disney and Time Warner, a re-
flection of the rise of information and
entertainment. Holding its place among
the corporate elite was McDonald’s, the
quintessential expression of America’s
taste for fast food. Starbucks, the ubiqui-
tous purveyor of coffee, came out of
nowhere to rank among the 500 largest
U.S. companies.
• The number of pharmaceutical
companies increased by 103 between
1990 and 1998—going from 65 to 168.
Every pharmaceutical company in busi-
ness for the entire period moved up in
the rankings, marching ahead on new
treatments for AIDs, impotence and other
conditions. Genentech, a firm working
on DNA products, leaped over 303 en-
terprises in market value.
• Prepackaged software has been
one of the economy’s high fliers. The
number of publicly traded companies
rose from just 58 in 1990 to 328 by
1998. Microsoft shot straight to the top
ranks of corporate America. Oracle, Com-
puter Associates, BMC Software, Com-
puware, PeopleSoft and other software
manufacturers also improved their posi-
tions among public companies.
• Led by industry giants Intel and
Texas Instruments, producers of semi-
conductors and related devices increased
their value relative to the market. Others
in this group include Micron Technol-
ogy, Maxim Integrated Products, Linear
Technology and Altera Corp.
• Results have been mixed among
telecommunications businesses. Some
of the biggest names slipped—AT&T,
BellSouth, GTE Corp. and US West, for
example. The expanding long-distance
market allowed Sprint, MCI and World-
Com to improve their positions even be-
fore the latter two companies merged.
• In financial services, the biggest
banks tended to get bigger and move
up in the rankings, a fact that shouldn’t
surprise after a decade of highly pub-
licized mergers. Wachovia, Sun Trust
and First Chicago resisted the urge to
merge and lost ground. There were 182
new savings institutions—most of them
small, regional operations.
• For security brokers and dealers,
the great bull market of the 1990s has
paid off handsomely. Morgan Stanley,
Paine Webber and Merrill Lynch leap-
frogged over hundreds of companies.
Charles Schwab, leader of a new breed
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Table 1
America’s Top 20
Rank 1917 1945 1967 1987 1998 (August)
1 U.S. Steel AT&T IBM IBM General Electric
2 AT&T General Motors AT&T Exxon Microsoft
3 Standard Oil of DuPont Kodak General Coca-Cola
New Jersey Electric
4 Bethlehem Steel Standard Oil of General Motors AT&T Exxon
New Jersey
5 Armour & Co. General Electric Standard Oil of General Merck
New Jersey Motors
6 Swift & Co. Union Carbide Texaco DuPont Wal-Mart
7 International Humble Oil & Sears, Roebuck Ford Pfizer
Harvester Refining
8 DuPont Sears, Roebuck General Electric Merck Intel
9 Midvale Steel & U.S. Steel Polaroid Amoco IBM
Ordnance
10 U.S. Rubber Texas Co. Gulf Oil Digital Procter &
Equipment Gamble
11 General Electric Coca-Cola DuPont Philip Morris Philip Morris
12 International Standard Oil Xerox Chevron Bristol-Myers
Mercantile Marine of Indiana Squibb
13 American Smelting Standard Oil Minnesota Sears, Lucent
& Refining of California Mining & Roebuck Technologies
Manufacturing
14 Anaconda Chrysler Standard Oil Mobil Johnson &
Copper Mining of California Johnson
15 Standard Oil Kodak Mobil BellSouth Cisco Systems
of New York
16 Phelps Dodge Gulf Oil GTE Kodak AT&T
17 Singer International Avon Standard Oil American
Nickel International
Group
18 Jones & Laughlin Socony-Vacuum Hewlett- Hewlett- Berkshire
Steel Oil Packard Packard Hathaway
19 Westinghouse Kennecott Procter & Coca-Cola Eli Lilly
Electric Copper Gamble
20 American Pennsylvania Standard Oil Wal-Mart SBC
Tobacco Railroad of Indiana Communications
NOTE: Rankings are based on market value.
SOURCES: Forbes, July 13, 1987 (1917, 1945, 1967, 1987);Standard & Poor’s Compustat database (1998).profits—and thus future sales—the
same patterns are often already appar-
ent in companies’ current sales.
11 An en-
tirely separate view of the churn, how-
ever, comes from looking at the total
number of establishments (publicly and
privately held) in each industry (Table 2).
Fur goods showed the largest decline
from 1990 to 1996, most likely a reflection
of changing tastes and animal rights
campaigns. Once health concerns became
paramount, asbestos producers went into
decline. Movie buffs aren’t going to
drive-ins anymore. Among the other busi-
nesses experiencing declines are barber
shops, broom and brush manufacturing,
bowling alleys, manufactured ice, and
radio and television repair.
Consumers’ preferences and new
technologies lie behind the biggest win-
ners. Videotape rentals have boomed as
the VCR has become a fixture in Amer-
ican households. New technology also
lies behind the boom in prepackaged
software, semiconductors and computing
equipment. As Americans have gotten
wealthier, they’ve spent a greater part of
their disposable income on entertain-
ment and services. So the country has
more movie production, more amuse-
ment parks, more eating and drinking
establishments and more travel-related
businesses. It has more carpet cleaners
and car washes. The demands of health-
conscious Americans have also given
rise to nearly 3,000 new physical fitness
facilities in just the past six years.
Appreciating the Churn
The churn among firms illustrates
that a free enterprise system never
stands still. Constant, sometimes unset-
tling change is an indispensable part of
what could be called the Great Ameri-
can Growth Machine. At its core are
consumers and their endless list of
needs, wants, conveniences, amuse-
ments and luxuries. Unlimited wants
clash with the fundamental fact of lim-
ited resources—a.k.a. scarcity. We can’t
have everything we want, but we can
satisfy more of our desires if we con-
serve and stretch our resources. For em-
ployers and workers, it means boosting
productivity, the driving force for higher
wages. For consumers, it means shop-
of discount brokers, showed the most
striking gain, moving up 733 notches to
311th place.
• Some specialty retailers did well.
Staples and Office Depot jumped up
sharply. So did Ross clothing outlets, the
Gap and Abercrombie & Fitch. Among
grocery stores, Safeway, Kroger, Fred
Meyer and Publix moved up.
9 The suc-
cess of Amazon.com and other Internet
retailers was just part of a boom that 
resulted in the creation of 55 new, 
publicly held catalog and mail-order
houses. Wal-Mart held its own, but other
variety stores slid, with Kmart down 239
places and Venture Stores falling 8,025
spots. Department stores are losing
favor: only one of 12 existing chains
gained ground.
• Air transportation was a mixed bag.
Stock prices reflected the success of low-
cost airlines. Continental surged more
than 1,100 places; Southwest and US
Airways rose, too. Traditional carriers
slipped in the rankings, with UAL Corp.,
parent of United Airlines, falling 265
places.
• Many old-line restaurant chains lost
their luster. Of the 54 public companies
operating eating places from 1990 to
1998, 52 fell in the rankings. Luby’s,
Shoney’s, Spaghetti Warehouse and Siz-
zler all declined at least 1,682 spots.
10
Eighty-six new restaurant companies
emerged in the 1990s, evidence that
Americans are dining out more often.
Jumping into the corporate rankings at
relatively high spots were the compa-
nies behind Planet Hollywood, Papa
John’s Pizza and Outback Steakhouse.
• As the economy moved toward
technology and services, basic indus-
tries continued their relative declines.
The tally of companies falling in the
corporate rankings: 88 of 91 crude oil
and natural gas producers, 10 of 12 agri-
cultural companies, all 10 woven-fabric
mills, 11 of 12 women’s clothing stores,
44 of 46 electric utilities and all shoe
manufacturers except athletic footwear
kingpins Nike and Reebok.
The Establishment View
Market value isn’t the only measure
of corporate America’s ups and downs.
While market value anticipates future
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Table 2
They Come and They Go
Number of
Selected establishments
shrinking industries 1970 1996
Fur goods 980 133
Barber shops 24,577 4,499
Asbestos products 133 30
Drive-in theaters 1,567 408
Leather and leather 3,430 1,938
products
General merchandise 25,032 14,797
stores
Glass containers 128 78
Brooms and brushes 449 278
Trailer parks and campsites 6,419 3,984
Bowling centers 9,215 5,735
Concrete block and brick 1,332 901
Manufactured ice 800 578
Variety stores 14,439 10,848
Radio and television repair 7,953 6,212
Labor organizations 20,376 19,536
Selected expanding industries
Videotape rental 0 20,816
Computer and 6,517 88,911
data processing
services (1975)




Vocational schools 1,188 6,816
Movie production 2,922 14,680
and services
Semiconductors and 291 1,052
related devices
Amusement parks 362 1,174
Chocolate and cocoa 51 165
products (1975)
Car washes 4,624 13,334
Political organizations 928 2,579
Office and computing 923 2,112
equipment
Eating and drinking places 233,048 466,386
Colleges and universities 1,855 3,663
Florists 13,865 26,728
Tour operators (1988) 2,464 4,725
Dental offices 63,817 113,054
Internal combustion engines 162 277
Passenger car rental 2,556 4,231
Pharmaceuticals 1,041 1,637
Aircraft 163 255
Plastic bottles (1988) 280 437
Aircraft engines and parts 247 355
Physical fitness 7,723 10,720
facilities (1990)
Hotels and motels 34,674 45,252
Travel agencies (1988) 22,609 28,735
Space vehicle 39 45
equipment (1975)
Beauty shops 70,967 81,872
NOTE: Establishments are classified based on
their major activity.
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census County
Business Patterns, various years.What’s really going on is a healthy
recycling of resources. In other words,
it’s conservation, not carnage.
— W. Michael Cox
Richard Alm s Notes
1 On December 22, 1998, Sears, Roebuck and Co.’s market capitaliza-
tion was $15.8 billion, compared with $17 billion for Amazon.com.
2 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 1992 Annual Report.
3 Schumpeter (1950, p. 83).
4 Although typically scorned, hostile takeovers, too, are a vital part of
the economy’s health-revitalization process. Corporate raiders and
liquidators, in essence, act like an autoimmune system for the econ-
omy—surrounding, terminating and removing bad management
practices that plague company profitability, thereby restoring the
overall economy to health.
5 In 1997, 83,384 businesses failed in the United States, most of 
them small enterprises. Over the past quarter century, the failure rate
doubled—from 44 per 10,000 concerns in 1970 to 88 in 1997—
again, indicative of a faster churn.
6 Further discussion of downsizing and economic churn can be found
in Cox and Alm (1999, Chapter 6).
7 With the exception of Amazon.com and Sears, all market values in
this article are calculated as of August 1998. All rankings (including
those of Sears and Amazon.com) are also as of August.
8 Again, the analysis involves publicly traded companies only.
9 Kroger and Fred Meyer announced a $13 billion merger in October
1998.
10 In September 1998, Consolidated Restaurant Cos. announced it
would buy Spaghetti Warehouse in a $60 million deal. Once the
transaction is completed, Spaghetti Warehouse will disappear from
the corporate rankings.
11 Because tomorrow is more uncertain than today, rankings based on
market value are generally more volatile than those based on sales;
but market value data more clearly reveal coming shifts in employ-
ment and sales.
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ping for the best value. The system works
because of competition: companies vie
for customers, making more money if
they’re able to cut costs while offering
consumers a better deal (Chart 1).
With many competitors, there’s a
constant drive to find new ways to meet
consumers’ needs—that is, to innovate.
Companies offer lower prices, better per-
formance, new features, catchier styling,
faster service, more convenient loca-
tions, higher status, aggressive market-
ing or attractive packaging. Innovation
comes in constant waves: inventions of
new goods and services, improvements
to existing products and increases in 
the efficiency of the factory, farm and
office. The interplay of innovation and
competition roils the status quo. New
firms and industries emerge to take the
market from existing ones. Surviving
firms reorganize production using more,
newer and better tools, making workers
more productive. Consumers’ tastes and
expectations evolve. Companies that can
no longer deliver what consumers want
at ever-cheaper prices don’t survive.
As with the churn of jobs, there’s no
mistaking where the change in Amer-
ica’s corporate pecking order is taking
us—to a postindustrial economy that
provides what Americans want. We may
lament the tragedies of the churn’s
downside, but we shouldn’t lose sight
of its very powerful and important up-
side: it makes us better off.


























“Most new firms are founded with an idea
and for a definite purpose. The life goes
out of them when that idea or purpose
has been fulfilled or has become obsolete
or even if, without having become obso-
lete, it has ceased to be new. That is the
fundamental reason why firms do not
exist forever. Many of them are, of course,
failures from the start. Like human beings,
firms are constantly being born that can-
not live. Others may meet what is akin, in
the case of men, to death from accident
or illness. Still others die a ‘natural’ death,
as men die of old age. And the ‘natural’
cause, in the case of firms, is precisely
their inability to keep up the pace in inno-
vating which they themselves had been
instrumental in setting in the time of their
vigor.” Schumpeter (1939, pp. 94–95)
“Individual innovations imply, by virtue 
of their nature, a ‘big’ step and a ‘big’
change. A railroad through new country,
i.e., country not yet served by railroads,
as soon as it gets into working order 
upsets all conditions of location, all cost
calculations, all production functions
within its radius of influence; and hardly
any ‘ways of doing things’ which have
been optimal before remain so after-
ward.”  Schumpeter (1939, p. 101)
“The opening up of new markets, foreign
or domestic, and the organizational de-
velopment from the craft shop and factory
to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate
the same process of industrial mutation—
if I may use that biological term—that 
incessantly revolutionizes the economic
structure  from within, incessantly destroy-
ing the old one, incessantly creating a new
one. This process of Creative Destruction
is the essential fact about capitalism. It is
what capitalism consists in and every
capitalistic concern has got to live in.”
Schumpeter (1950, p. 83)Page  10 Southwest Economy   January/February 1999
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N DECEMBER 1994, the world
watched the financial meltdown of
Mexico in disbelief. Most analysts
had regarded Mexico’s economic
prospects as among the brightest
in Latin America, especially after
the inception of the North American
Free Trade Agreement at the beginning
of that year. Mexico’s sudden and un-
expected collapse started when its cen-
tral bank devalued the peso about 15
percent on December 20. What was in-
tended as a minor correction triggered a
massive capital outflow that forced the
Banco de México to abandon the de-
fense of the peso and let it float. Within
a month, the peso had lost almost 40
percent of its value. In the form of the
so-called tequila effect, the crisis spread
to other Latin American countries, espe-
cially Argentina, and even to East Asia.
The crisis’ devastating effect on
emerging markets everywhere finally
seemed to be subsiding when, on July
2, 1997, Thailand sought a small correc-
tion of its own exchange rate and let its
currency float. The pattern seen in Mex-
ico was repeated. A relatively small de-
valuation of about 20 percent triggered
a financial stampede, and by year’s end
the Thai baht had lost almost 50 percent
of its value against the U.S. dollar.
The crisis did not remain confined to
Thailand. Like its Mexican counterpart
almost three years earlier, the crisis
quickly spread to other countries in the
region, with Malaysia, Indonesia and
South Korea the most affected. Analysts
were stunned by such a turn of events
in what had been the fastest growing
part of the world for two decades. The
aftershocks of the financial earthquake
were felt as far afield as Latin America
(especially Brazil) and Russia.
The dramatic occurrence of financial
crises just three years apart has prompted
much research. Unfortunately, much
paper and ink later, economists have yet
to produce any convincing answers.
The explanations they offer are typically
little more than working hypotheses,
many of them seemingly aimed at mak-
ing headlines rather than science. Ex-
plaining these crises requires hard
work, not overnight inspiration. In at-
tempting to understand them, econo-
mists and policymakers face the same
difficult task as doctors do in research-
ing and curing cancer.
Indeed, there are many parallels be-
tween cancer and exchange rate and 
financial crises. Doctors can recognize
cancer and sometimes explain how it
works once a person has it, but they
usually cannot predict whether and
when the disease will strike a particular
person. Likewise, economists can rec-
ognize a financial or currency crisis when
they see one, but they generally are un-
able to anticipate whether or when it
will hit a particular country.
Moreover, doctors know much about
metastasis, the process by which cancer
in certain organs of the human body can
quickly and lethally spread to other 
organs. Similarly, economists are knowl-
edgeable about the contagion effects 
of financial crises and how they can
spread from one country to the next 
almost overnight.
Despite recent progress, medical re-
searchers are still far from fully under-
standing the ultimate causes of cancer,
and they often cannot cure or eradicate
it as a result. Their situation is analogous
to that of economists examining finan-
cial and currency crises. Many in the pro-
fession who thought they completely
understood such occurrences are less
sure of it since the Mexican and East
Asian crises.
Until those episodes, most econo-
mists considered a lack of fiscal disci-
pline the culprit in currency and finan-
cial disease. The diagnosis appeared
correct because fiscal indiscipline did
seem responsible for some crises in the
past. From there, economists jumped to
the conclusion that fiscal indiscipline is
the ultimate cause of all currency crises
and financial meltdowns. But in 1994,
Mexico had an exchange rate crisis
even though the country was fiscally
sound. Because the Mexican crisis de-
fied conventional wisdom, the manag-
ing director of the International Mone-
tary Fund dubbed it the first crisis of the
21st century.
What is puzzling about the latest
generation of crises is that they seem as
unforgiving as cancer: both can strike 
in the absence of behavior that might
have increased the odds of getting the
disease. Lung cancer can certainly hit
heavy smokers. But some heavy smok-
ers never get the disease, while some
people who have never smoked do get
lung cancer.
Mexico and East Asian countries
were not “heavy smokers,” in the sense
that by OECD standards, their fiscal ac-
counts were exemplary at the time they
were hit by crisis. In fact, Mexican and
South Korean policies were considered
sound enough to gain the two countries
admission into the OECD not long be-
fore their respective crises.
But when Thailand’s crisis hit and In-
donesia’s and Malaysia’s followed, econo-
mists decided that even if current fiscal
imbalances (current smoking) were not
part of the problem, it must have been
the anticipation of future fiscal prob-
lems (future smoking) that spooked in-
vestors. According to this explanation,
the problem in East Asia was not the ex-
plicit fiscal deficit but the deficit implicit
in fragile financial systems that eventu-
ally would require bailouts. Bailouts did,
indeed, occur, increasing government
debt by as much as 15 percent of GDP
in Mexico and South Korea, for example.
This theory is not without its flaws.
That a loan is bad becomes obvious 
to everyone once a borrower has de-
faulted. To be convincing, such a theory
should prove that the loans that went
sour were an obviously bad bet before
Do International Financial Crises Defy Diagnosis?
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Further Information 
on the Data
For more information on employment
data, see “Reassessing Texas Employment
Growth” (Southwest Economy, July/August
1993). For TIPI, see “The Texas Industrial 
Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic 
Review, November 1989). For the Texas
Leading Index and its components, see 
“The Texas Index of Leading Indicators: 
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas
Fed  Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are
available on the Dallas Fed’s Internet Web
site, www.dallasfed.org.
Thousands of persons Index, 1987 = 100 September–November 1998
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment Net Contributions of Components to Change in Leading Index
Texas Total and Major Area Employment
Index, December 1997 = 100
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1995 = 100
Percent
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EXAS AS A whole grew at a 3.3-percent annual rate in
the first 11 months of 1998, but the growth was not
evenly distributed throughout the state. Low com-
modity prices and inclement weather depressed
growth in agriculture and energy, causing problems
not only for Texas but also for Texas’ major trading
partners—Mexico and Canada. While some regions of the
state were largely insulated from these effects by low interest
rates and the continued strength of the U.S. economy, other
regions were fully exposed. As a general rule, agricultural
areas, the oil patch and the border with Mexico grew more
slowly than the rest of the state.
The major exception was El Paso, which grew more rapidly
than the state average in 1998 (see chart below). El Paso
added 8,500 jobs between December 1997 and November
1998 as strong job growth in services, government and trans-
T
Regional Economic Indicators
Texas employment* Total nonfarm employment*
Texas Private
Leading TIPI** Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
11/98 120.5 128.8 163.7 500.6 1,106.9 1,524.0 5,742.6 9,037.8 1,889.2 722.3
10/98 122.1 129.2 164.5 497.3 1,107.8 1,521.9 5,730.6 9,022.1 1,885.2 722.2
9/98 120.0 129.7 166.1 495.2 1,109.2 1,522.5 5,714.4 9,007.4 1,886.0 720.6
8/98 120.6 129.7 167.2 498.4 1,108.3 1,512.0 5,704.6 8,990.5 1,885.9 721.4
7/98 123.1 129.9 168.4 496.4 1,106.2 1,505.1 5,689.9 8,966.0 1,891.0 721.0
6/98 123.4 129.7 168.6 494.7 1,108.8 1,500.7 5,677.8 8,950.6 1,890.9 719.1
5/98 124.6 130.0 168.8 495.2 1,106.8 1,492.9 5,660.5 8,924.2 1,887.2 717.2
4/98 124.6 128.6 168.8 491.8 1,105.7 1,489.0 5,631.1 8,886.4 1,884.5 715.9
3/98 124.4 129.1 171.1 483.4 1,106.7 1,494.2 5,607.6 8,863.0 1,883.8 714.7
2/98 124.9 128.9 171.1 482.2 1,104.7 1,491.6 5,587.9 8,837.5 1,882.6 714.0
1/98 123.9 128.9 170.3 477.7 1,104.5 1,490.9 5,568.6 8,812.0 1,878.8 714.6
12/97 123.2 128.8 171.2 472.4 1,097.2 1,487.5 5,546.2 8,774.5 1,866.1 712.7
* in thousands
** Texas Industrial Production Index
s
portation more than offset job losses in other industries.
Maquiladora industries are a bright spot in the Mexican econ-
omy, and much of El Paso’s strength relative to other cities
along the border with Mexico can be attributed to El Paso’s
position as a service, supply and distribution center for the
maquiladoras.
Primarily as a result of the solid employment growth, El
Paso’s traditionally high unemployment rate fell in 1998 to its
lowest average annual rate of the decade—10 percent. De-
spite the recent declines, however, the unemployment rate in
El Paso remains more than double that of any other large
Texas metropolitan area. Among Texas cities, only Browns-
ville and McAllen have higher unemployment rates than El
Paso.
—Lori L. TaylorSWE SWE SWE









the fact. Such proof will be hard to
find because it would imply that
the lenders were negligent when
they evaluated the loans and de-
cided they were acceptable risks.
Do theoretical economists know
more than bankers and financial
intermediaries about the quality of
a loan? Do they know more than
those who recommended OECD
membership for Mexico and South
Korea? Or is this theory just an-
other example of Monday morning
quarterbacking?
Despite what remains unknown
about cancer, one thing doctors do
know is that history seems to play
a role in the disease. A person is
more likely to get cancer or a par-
ticular form of cancer if there is a
family history of it. Likewise, coun-
tries that experience capital account
blowouts and financial meltdowns
are often countries that may be be-
having well (not smoking) now
but have a history of policy insta-
bility (smoking in the past) that
some in the investment commu-
nity have not forgotten. This does
not mean that countries with an
exemplary past will always dodge
financial crises, any more than 
patients with no family history of
cancer always elude the disease. It
does mean that reputation is im-
portant in a world where countries
of recent virtue are penalized for
histories of impropriety, as Mexico
and Argentina had. Perhaps one
reason Chile was not as seriously
hit by the tequila effect was that 
its most recent improprieties were
much farther in the past than Mex-
ico’s and Argentina’s or, for that
matter, Brazil’s.
Another thing economists do
know is that both Mexico and
Thailand had a policy of pegged
exchange rates—that is, exchange
rates that fell somewhere between
fully flexible and absolutely fixed.
The apparent commonality has led
to speculation that as a result of
these financial crises, “the options
for currencies have been…‘hollowed
out.’ Governments should let them
either float, or fix them perma-
nently (with a currency board, or
in a monetary union).” (The Econ-
omist, November 28, 1998, p. 82)
Such speculation will have to
meet scientific standards before it
can be regarded as anything more
than just that—speculation.
Meanwhile, intellectual honesty
requires that economists admit
they do not fully understand the
currency and financial crises of the
late 20th century. Sadly, this means
the only sure bet is that many such
crises will occur in the 21st century
before their causes and cures are
found.
—Carlos E. J. M. Zarazaga
BEYONDTHEBORDER
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